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In 2016 independent or private schools made headlines as learners protested the 
codes of conduct of various schools and the lack of accommodation of African 
hairstyles. The question of a school’s autonomy to enact a code of conduct and 
prohibit certain religious or cultural dress is not new and there has been worldwide 
controversy regarding schools banning the Islamic headscarf. This article examines 
the obligation of South African public and independent schools to accommodate the 
headscarf and diverse hairstyles. It argues that the Islamic headscarf is a central 
tenet of the Islamic faith protected by the constitutional right to religious freedom and 
that given the current guidelines on school uniforms, public schools are bound to 
accommodate the headscarf. The matter is more nuanced with independent schools 
that may be established in the pursuit of a religious ethos. The article argues that 
independent schools are equally prohibited from discrimination on religious and 
cultural grounds and must demonstrate the justifiability of the lack of accommodation. 
While these bans may be allowed, the historical inequalities in education and the 
socio-economic context in which the provision of excellent education still favours 
certain races must be weighed carefully against the school’s religious vision. 
    Hairstyles are a more complex matter given their diversity. The article argues that 
disputes as to whether a hairstyle forms part of a culture are likely to become difficult 
given the porous and evolving nature of culture. Public and independent schools are 
rather urged to re-evaluate their codes of conduct. Codes that favour Eurocentric 
notions of neatness may indirectly discriminate on race, a completely untenable 
situation in a constitutional South Africa. These codes must be revised to celebrate 






“Cultures are living and contested formations. The protection of the 
Constitution extends to those for whom culture gives meaning, not only to 
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    In 2016, a furore erupted with allegations of discriminatory treatment of 
learners at Pretoria High School for Girls. A newspaper article, reminiscent 
of apartheid, reported that the school had deemed afros untidy and students 
were being forced to chemically straighten their hair.
2
 Shortly thereafter 
protests flared up at Sans Souci High School in Cape Town
3
 and Saint 
Michael’s School for Girls in Bloemfontein
4
 around, amongst others, the 
schools controversially regulating the hair of black students. The 2016 
school protests were elevated as they flared up amidst the ongoing protests 
for decolonised higher education institutions.
5
 Questions were asked about 
transformation in schools and their accommodation of diverse cultural 
beliefs, particularly in the face of increasingly diverse learner bodies. 
    The issue of the accommodation of learner’s cultural and religious beliefs 
is not new and whether schools should allow Muslim learners to wear a 
headscarf at school has been a recurring question over the last few years.
6
 
    This article discusses the duty of public and independent schools to 
accommodate diverse cultural and religious beliefs. First, it sets out the legal 
framework that governs the issue by examining the relevant constitutional 
provisions and the national legislation enacted to prohibit discrimination, 
being the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act
7
 
(“PEPUDA”). Thereafter it analyses the specific obligations of schools in 
terms of the South African Schools Act
8
 (hereinafter “the School’s Act”). 
Finally, it examines how this legal framework impacts on the right of both 
                                                          
1
 MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) 54. 
2
 The Guardian “Racism Row over South Africa School’s Alleged Hair Policy” (29 August 
2016) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/29/south-africa-pretoria-high-school-
for-girls-afros (accessed 2018-03-20). 
3
 Mail and Guardian “Sans Souci Girls’ High School Pupils Protest against ‘Discriminatory’ 
Code of Conduct” (1 September 2016) https://mg.co.za/article/2016-09-01-sans-souci-girls-
high-school-pupils-protest-against-discriminatory-code-of-conduct (accessed 2018-03-20). 
4
 Coetzee “Schoolgirls’ Hair Drama Spills over to Bloemfontein” (30 August 2016) 
http://www.bloemfonteincourant.co.za/plans-construction-free-states-first-mother-child-
hospital-approved/ (accessed 2018-03-20). 
5
 The Conversation “What ‘Decolonised Education’ Should and Shouldn’t Mean” (14 February 
2017) http://theconversation.com/what-decolonised-education-should-and-shouldnt-mean-
72597 (accessed 2018-03-20); Mathume “South African Students Demand Free and 
Decolonised Education” (29 December 2016) https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/south-african-
students-demand-free-and-decolonised-education (accessed 2018-03-20). 
6
 Pijoos “Muslim Girls have to Carry ‘Concession Cards’ to Wear Headscarf at Joburg School” 
(5 June 2017) https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/muslim-girls-have-to-carry-
concession-cards-to-wear-headscarf-at-joburg-school-20170605 (accessed 2018-03-20); 
Nyoka and De Villiers “Principal Instructed to Allow Muslim Pupil to Wear Hijab” (6 June 
2017) https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/principal-instructed-to-allow-muslim-
pupil-to-wear-hijab-20170606 (accessed 2018-03-20). Furthermore, in 2007 the 
Constitutional Court, in MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay supra, decided on 
whether a public school unfairly discriminated against a Hindu learner by failing to allow the 
learner to wear a nose stud to school. In 2013, the Free State High Court, in Radebe v 
Principal of Leseding Technical School [2013] ZAFSHC 111, found that a public school had 
discriminated against a Rastafarian learner based on her religion by failing to allow the 
learner to wear dreadlocks at the school. 
7
 Act 4 of 2000. 
8
 Act 84 of 1996. 
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public and independent schools to regulate dress and hairstyles through 
their code of conduct. 
 
2 LEGAL  FRAMEWORK 
 
South Africa is a constitutional supremacy and the Constitution binds both 
public and private bodies.
9
 This section explains the rights to religion and 
culture, PEPUDA and the School’s Act and their implications for school 
governing bodies to accommodate cultural and religious practices in their 
codes of conduct. 
 
2 1 Right  to  culture 
 
The South African Constitutional Court in Pillay held that “our Constitution 
does not tolerate diversity as a necessary evil, but affirms it as one of the 
primary treasures of our nation.”
10
 Diversity and difference are valued and 
protected in a range of provisions in the South African Constitution. 
    Section 30 of the Constitution protects the individual right to culture and 
protects the right of individuals to use the language and participate in the 
cultural life of their choice.
11
 Section 31 protects the group right to culture 
and provides that individuals have the right to enjoy their culture, practise 
their religion and use their language and form and maintain cultural, religious 
and linguistic associations.
12
 The group right contains an internal limitation 
clause which provides that it may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent 
with the Constitution
13
 and of course, remains subject to limitation in terms of 
the general limitation clause.
14
 
    Culture is an ambiguous notion and it is generally thought to be defined by 
factors such as shared language, religion or cultural practices.
15
 The 
Constitutional Court in Pillay suggested that it was broader than these 
notions but ultimately did not decide on its parameters.
16
 Ampofo-Anti and 
                                                          
9
 S 8(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter “the 
Constitution”). For a discussion of the horizontal application of rights see Chirwa “The 
Horizontal Application of Constitutional Rights in a Comparative Perspective” 2006 10 Law, 
Democracy and Development 21 37−45. 
10
 MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay supra 92. 
11
 S 30 provides: 
“Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of their 
choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any 
provision of the Bill of Rights.” 
12
 S 31 provides: 
“(1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied 
the right, with other members of that community−  
(a) to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language; and  
(b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other 
organs of civil society. 
 (2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any 
provision of the Bill of Rights.” 
13
 S 31(2) of the Constitution. 
14
 S 36 of the Constitution. 
15
 Bennett Customary Law in South Africa (2004) 86. 
16
 MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay supra 48−49. 
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Bishop note that courts often brush over questions such as: What is a 
culture? and Does the claimant and practice form part of the culture? 
because these questions are frequently not in dispute.
17
 They argue, 
however, that these may be important considerations in determining the 
limits of cultural accommodation.
18
 The authors offer a definition of a culture 
as follows: a group of people who may share certain characteristics like 
language or religion and certain beliefs and values, who consider 
themselves a culture and are recognised by others as a culture which may 
overlap with other cultures and whose members engage in practices 
because of their membership in a group that are heterogeneous and evolve 
over time.
19
 Furthermore, the determination of whether a claimant is a 
member of a cultural group is proposed to be answered through a combined 
subjective and objective test namely: (a) the claimant must view herself as a 
member of the culture; and (b) they must be accepted by at least some other 
members as part of that culture.
20
 
    The third question of whether the claimant’s belief or practice forms part of 
the culture is the most relevant and contentious in practice.
21
 Arguably the 
two key questions needed to be asked are, first, whether a subjective or 
objective approach should be adopted in determining whether a practice 
forms part of a culture?
22
 Secondly, does the Constitution protect mandatory 
or voluntary cultural practices?
23
 
    Ampofo-Anti and Bishop argue, rightly in our view, that Langa CJ in Pillay 
refrained from answering the question of whether to adopt the subjective or 
objective approach on the basis that both approaches would lead to the 
same conclusion in the case.
24
 The authors acknowledge the dangers of 
adopting a purely subjective or objective approach and advocate a middle 
ground approach where the claimant is required to show that the practice is 
followed by a portion of the members of their culture who do so because of 
its cultural significance.
25
 They do not propose a fixed percentage of 
members of the culture who need to adhere to a cultural practice and this 
may vary depending on the facts of each case.
26
 
                                                          
17
 Ampofo-Anti and Bishop “On the Limits of Cultural Accommodation: KwaZulu-Natal MEC for 
Education v Pillay: Part III: Reflections on Themes in Justice Langa’s Judgments” 2015 Acta 
Juridica 456 462. The authors note that these questions were not considered in MEC for 
Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay supra nor in Kievits Kroon Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v 
Mmoledi (2012) 33 ILJ 2812 (LAC) and Department of Correctional Services v Police and 
Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU) 2013 (4) SA 176 (SCA), two recent cases involving 
claims for cultural exemptions. 
18
 Ampofo-Anti and Bishop 2015 Acta Juridica 463. 
19
 Ampofo-Anti and Bishop 2015 Acta Juridica 472−473. 
20
 Ampofo-Anti and Bishop 2015 Acta Juridica 471. 
21






 Ampofo-Anti and Bishop 2015 Acta Juridica 476. 
25
 Ampofo-Anti and Bishop 2015 Acta Juridica 476−477. They argue that the approach is 
consonant with O’Regan J’s minority judgment in Pillay where she held that “a court must 
investigate whether a practice is shared by the broader community, or portion of it, to qualify 
as a cultural practice rather than a personal habit or preference.” See MEC for Education: 
Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay supra 154. 
26
 Ampofo-Anti and Bishop 2015 Acta Juridica 477. 
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    In light of the current jurisprudence on culture, it is unlikely that the 
definition of culture or whether an individual adheres to a culture will be 
disputed in courts. More likely courts will be called upon to decide whether a 
practice constitutes a cultural practice. In this regard, courts should arguably 
adopt the combined objective and subjective approach in line with that of 
O’Regan J in Pillay to determine whether “the claimant follows the practice 
because of its communal and associative role in constructing her identity, 
not her own personal preferences”.
27
 Such an approach places limits on the 
right to culture and guards against individuals claiming every action as a 
cultural practice. At the same time, it accommodates the variable nature of 
culture which may be practised differently by individuals. 
    Given the variable nature of culture and that it is generally not 
prescriptively enforced on adherents, the right should be interpreted 
generously to protect voluntary practices. The reality is that most cultures 
are not as organised as religion and do not have obligatory requirements but 
rather practices which individuals choose to observe.
28
 Given the voluntary 
nature of cultural practices, protecting only mandatory practices would 
render the right to culture meaningless.
29
 The Constitutional Court in Pillay 
argued that voluntary practices are no less part of a person’s identity and are 
likely to enhance a person’s sense of identity, autonomy and dignity.
30
 This 
conforms to a constitutional obligation to celebrate diversity and not merely 
tolerate it.
31
 The voluntary/mandatory nature of the practice is perhaps more 
relevant in the determination of whether any discrimination is fair.
32
 
    The right to culture is important in South Africa today. For some 
individuals, cultural practices are as important as religious beliefs
33
 and are 
often central to an individual’s self-identity and human dignity.
34
 For many 
individuals, they give a sense of belonging and value, and thus the right 
should not be underestimated. Despite the indeterminacy and ambiguous 
nature of the right to culture, it is central to an individual’s identity and dignity 
and, therefore, interferences with the right must be carefully considered. 
 
2 2 Freedom  of  religion 
 
The right to culture often overlaps with the right to freedom of religion. The 
Constitutional Court in Pillay held that religious practices are often informed 
by cultural beliefs while cultural beliefs often have an underlying religious 
basis.
35
 Thus a single practice may constitute both a cultural and religious 
practice and it must be borne in mind that there is often a great deal of 
overlap between the rights to religion and culture.
36
 








 MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay supra 64. 
31
 MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay supra 65. 
32
 MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay supra 67. 
33




 MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay supra 47. 
36
 Ibid. 
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    Section 15 of the Constitution provides for the freedom of religion, belief 
and opinion.
37
 Religious freedom protects beliefs which are often deeply 
personal and part of an individual’s self-identity. David Conkle notes that 
while the content of religious beliefs may differ amongst individuals, the 
common and distinct nature of these beliefs is that they define an individual 
and provide the framework through which individuals evaluate conduct.
38
 
This is because religious beliefs dictate in some instances, almost every 
aspect of an individual’s life from their dress and diet to their purpose in life 
and what they consider acceptable behaviour.
39
 
    In South Africa, religious freedom entails the right to hold a belief and the 
right to manifest a belief.
40
 The manifestation of religious belief 
encompasses worship or observance, practice and teaching.
41
 Section 15(2) 
allows religious observances in state or state-aided institutions provided they 
are in accordance with the public authorities’ rules, conducted on an 
equitable basis and attendance at them is voluntary.
42
 Like all other rights it 
is subject to the general limitation clause in section 36 of the Constitution. 
    In the determination of whether a practice is religious and worthy of 
protection, the court examines the sincerity of the claimant’s beliefs. 
Religious freedom in South Africa protects voluntary conduct based on 
sincerely held religious beliefs.
43
 Barring any evidence that the claimant is 
acting fraudulently, the court accepts the claimant’s profession regarding the 
practice. The court does not require the claimant to prove the objective 
requirements of their faith and courts are thought to be wholly ill-equipped to 
pronounce on the requirements of a religion which may be highly disputed 
issues. 
    The right to culture and religion are central to an individual’s sense of self-
identity, autonomy and dignity. The protection extends to voluntary practices 
which enhance our autonomy and dignity.
44
 Infringements of the right need 
                                                          
37
 S 15 of the Constitution. 
38
 Conkle “Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause” 1987−1988 82(4) North-
Western University LR 1113 1164. See also Marshall “Truth and the Religion Clauses” 
1993−1994 DePaul LR 243 247. 
39
 For a discussion on the importance of the right see Osman Freedom of Religion and the 
Headscarf: A Perspective from International and Comparative Constitutional Law 
(Unpublished master’s thesis University of Cape Town 2012) 9−14. 
40
 Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2001 (2) SA 388 (CC) 38 
and Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC) 19. 
41
 S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC) 92. 
42
 For a comprehensive discussion of the right see Farlam “Freedom of Religion, Belief and 
Opinion” in Constitutional Law of South Africa (2008), Chapter 41. 
43
 MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay supra 67. This approach accords with 
jurisprudence from the United States of America, Canada and Germany. See Thomas v 
Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division 45 U.S 707 715−716; Syndicat 
Northcrest v Amselem [2004] 2SCR 551, 2004 SCC 47 and Axel Frhr. Von Campenhausen 
“The German Headscarf Debate” 2004 Brigham Young University LR 665 678. For a 
discussion thereon see Osman Freedom of Religion and the Headscarf: A Perspective from 
International and Comparative Constitutional Law 29−31. 
44
 MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay supra 64. S 10 of the Constitution provides that 
“[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected”. 
In S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) 84, Chaskalson P stated that the right to life and 
the right to dignity were, together “the source of all other rights”. O’Regan J stated that: 
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to be carefully evaluated as they often force adherents to make the difficult 
choice of abiding by their beliefs or attaining some benefit. Such 
interferences with the right would constitute discrimination and the court 
would have to consider whether the discrimination is fair and may be upheld. 
 
2 3 PEPUDA 
 
The constitutional right to equality states that no person may be unfairly 
discriminated against on the grounds of, amongst others, religion or culture
45
 
and that legislation would be enacted to prevent such unfair discrimination. 
PEPUDA is the national legislation enacted to prevent unfair discrimination. 
Claims of unfair discrimination must be adjudicated in terms of the Act and 
parties cannot circumvent the legislation by direct reliance on the 
constitutional rights implicated.
46
 Discrimination may be established, 
however, by demonstrating an interference with rights to culture or religious 
                                                                                                                                        
“Respect for the dignity of all human beings is particularly important in South Africa. For 
apartheid was a denial of a common humanity. Black people were refused respect and 
dignity and thereby the dignity of all South Africans was diminished. The new constitution 
rejects this past and affirms the equal worth of all South Africans. Thus, recognition and 
protection of human dignity is the touchstone of the new political order and is fundamental 
to the new constitution.” 
In Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v 
Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) 35, the Court stated: 
“The value of dignity in our Constitutional framework cannot therefore be doubted. The 
Constitution asserts dignity to contradict our past in which human dignity for black South 
Africans was routinely and cruelly denied. It asserts it too to inform the future, to invest in 
our democracy respect for the intrinsic worth of all human beings. Human dignity therefore 
informs constitutional adjudication and interpretation at a range of levels. It is a value that 
informs the interpretation of many, possibly all, other rights. This Court has already 
acknowledged the importance of the constitutional value of dignity in interpreting rights such 
as the right to equality, the right not to be punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way, 
and the right to life. Human dignity is also a constitutional value that is of central 
significance in the limitations analysis. Section 10, however, makes it plain that dignity is not 
only a value fundamental to our Constitution, it is a justiciable and enforceable right that 
must be respected and protected.” 
45
 S 9(3) of the Constitution. In Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC) 
20, Mahomed DP had the following to say with regards to the right to equality in the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 (the interim Constitution): 
“There can be no doubt that the guarantee of equality lies at the very heart of the 
Constitution. It permeates and defines the very ethos upon which the Constitution is 
premised.
 
In the very first paragraph of the preamble it is declared that there is a “[n]eed to 
create a new order ... in which there is equality between men and women and people of all 
races so that all citizens shall be able to enjoy and exercise their fundamental rights and 
freedoms”. Section 8(1) guarantees to every person the right to equality before the law and 
to equal protection of the law. Section 8(2) protects every person from unfair discrimination 
on the grounds of race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture or language. These specified grounds are 
stated to be without derogation from the generality of the provision. Section 8(3)(a) makes it 
clear that nothing in sections 8(1) or (2) precludes measures designed to achieve the 
adequate protection or advancement of persons or groups or categories of persons 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, in order to enable their full and equal enjoyment of 
all rights and freedoms.” 
46
 MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay supra 40. See also Currie and De Waal The Bill 
of Rights Handbook (2013) 245. 





 The Act furthermore explicitly prohibits discrimination by both the 
state and private parties.
48
 
    Discrimination is defined in section 1 of PEPUDA as: 
 
“any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition or 
situation which directly or indirectly− 
(a) imposes burdens, obligations or disadvantage on; or 
(b) withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from, any person on one 
or more of the prohibited grounds”. 
 
    Discrimination on the list of prohibited grounds, such as religion or culture, 
is presumed to be unfair and the onus is on the respondent to prove that the 
discrimination is fair.
49
 Section 14 PEPUDA sets out the test for the 
determination of fair discrimination: 
 
“(1) It is not unfair discrimination to take measures designed to protect or 
advance persons or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination or the members of such groups or categories of persons. 
 (2) In determining whether the respondent has proved that the discrimination 
is fair, the following must be taken into account: 
(a) The context; 
(b) the factors referred to in subsection (3); 
(c) whether the discrimination reasonably and justifiably differentiates 
between persons according to objectively determinable criteria, 
intrinsic to the activity concerned. 
 (3) The factors referred to in subsection (2)(b) include the following: 
(a) Whether the discrimination impairs or is likely to impair human 
dignity; 
(b) the impact or likely impact of the discrimination on the complainant; 
(c) the position of the complainant in society and whether he or she 
suffers from patterns of disadvantage or belongs to a group that 
suffers from such patterns of disadvantage; 
(d) the nature and extent of the discrimination; 
(e) whether the discrimination is systemic in nature; 
(f) whether the discrimination has a legitimate purpose; 
(g) whether and to what extent the discrimination achieves its purpose; 
(h) whether there are less restrictive and less disadvantageous means 
to achieve the purpose; 
(i) whether and to what extent the respondent has taken such steps as 
being reasonable in the circumstances to- 
(i) address the disadvantage which arises from or is related to 
one or more of the prohibited grounds; or 
(ii) accommodate diversity.” 
    In addition, section 2 of the Schedule to PEPUDA lists practices that 
would be considered unfair in the education sector, namely: 
 
“(a) Unfairly excluding learners from educational institutions, including 
learners with special needs. 
                                                          
47
 MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay supra 46. 
48
 S 6 of the PEPUDA. 
49
 S 13(2) as read with the definition of “prohibited grounds” in the PEPUDA. 
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 (b) Unfairly withholding scholarships, bursaries, or any other form of 
assistance from learners of particular groups identified by the prohibited 
grounds. 
 (c) The failure to reasonably and practicably accommodate diversity in 
education.” 
 
    Both section 14 and the Schedule highlight the duty accommodation of 
diversity plays in the test for fairness. In explaining the notion of reasonable 
accommodation Langa CJ held that it sometimes requires an authority to 
take positive steps and even incur expenses to ensure individuals can enjoy 
their rights equally.
50
 In the context of employment law, the court warned of 
pushing to the edges of society those individuals who lack mainstream 
attributes
51
 and that positive conduct may be required to accommodate 
diversity and those who fall outside the norm.
52
 The degree of 
accommodation required will depend on the facts of each case but the court 
suggested that more than a mere negligible effort would be required to 
ensure those outside the mainstream could swim freely in its waters.
53
 
Langa CJ also held that accommodation is most appropriate, when the rule 
appears neutral but has a discriminatory effect and in schools and 
workplaces where competing interests can be more easily balanced.
54
 
    Therefore, in the context of dress codes at schools, it may be necessary 
for the school to ensure that they are taking positive steps to reasonably 
accommodate the learner so that that learner can enjoy their rights equally 
with other learners and thereby prevent unfair discrimination. 
 
2 4 South  African  Schools  Act 
 
The Schools Act regulates school education in South Africa with the purpose 
of addressing past injustice in education and combating discrimination.
55
 
Certain provisions apply only to public schools. Section 5(1) provides that 
public schools should not unfairly discriminate in any way. The Act does not 
define what constitutes “unfair discrimination” and this will most likely be 
interpreted in light of PEPUDA. Furthermore, the National Guidelines on 
School Uniform
56
 are meant to assist school governing bodies in the 
determination of a uniform. The Guidelines on School Uniform are not 
mandatory
57
 and arguably apply only to public schools as they were 
promulgated to assist governing bodies of public schools to adopt a code of 
conduct in terms of section 8(1) of the Act. They recommend that uniform 
policy “should take into account religious and cultural diversity within the 
community served by the school”.
58
 Learners’ religious beliefs should be 
                                                          
50
 MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay supra 73. For a discussion of Langa’s approach 
see Ampofo-Anti and Bishop 2015 Acta Juridica 474. 
51
 MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay supra 74. 
52
 MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay supra 75. 
53
 MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay supra 76. 
54
 MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay supra 78. 
55
 Preamble of the South African Schools Act. 
56
 National Guidelines on School Uniforms (hereinafter “the Guidelines on School Uniform”) 
GN 173 in GG 28538 of 2006-02-23. 
57
 National Guidelines on School Uniform par 34. 
58
 National Guidelines on School Uniform par 29(1). 
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accommodated, and schools should not prohibit learners from wearing 
headscarves as part of a religious practice.
59
 
    Furthermore, the National Policy on Religion and Education
60
 provides a 
framework for religious teaching and observance in public institutions and is 
not applicable to independent schools.
61
 The policy celebrates the diversity 
of the South African population and aims to ensure that no single religious 
ethos dominates others and that all religious views are recognised and 
respected in public schools. The policy recommends that when school 
governing bodies determine the policy for religious observance in schools, 
which includes dress, they do so in a manner that is consistent with the 
policy and applicable legislation.
62
 
    The constitutional provisions, PEPUDA and the Schools Act create a 
comprehensive framework for the prohibition of discrimination in South 
African schools. The framework promotes the celebration of diversity and the 
accommodation of minority practices in the educational sphere. It is against 
this background that policies that fail to accommodate the headscarf and 
hairstyles must be evaluated. 
 
2 5 Independent  schools 
 
Section 29(3) of the Constitution allows for the establishment of independent 
schools and only prohibits discrimination by independent schools based on 
race.
63
 Independent schools may operate in their preferred medium of 
instruction and promote a specific cultural and religious ethos.
64
 It suggests 
that private schools have more latitude than public schools to discriminate in 
their admission requirements.
65
 This is re-enforced by section 46(3) of the 
Schools Act which provides that the Head of Department must register an 
independent school if it is satisfied that, amongst others, the school’s 
admission policy does not discriminate on the basis of race.
66
 However, 
                                                          
59
 National Guidelines on School Uniform par 29(2). 
60
 Department of Education “National Policy on Religion and Education” (2003) 
https://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/religion_0.pdf (accessed 2018-03-20) (hereinafter 
“National Policy”). 
61
 National Policy 8. 
62
 National Policy 22. 
63
 S 29(3) of the Constitution provides: 
“Everyone has the right to establish and maintain, at their own expense, independent 
educational institutions that− 
(a) do not discriminate on the basis of race; 
(b) are registered with the state; and  
(c) maintain standards that are not inferior to standards at comparable public educational 
institutions.” 
64
 Woolman “Defending Discrimination: On the Constitutionality of Independent Schools that 
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PEPUDA’s prohibition on discrimination, discussed above, is much broader 




    The Constitution and PEPUDA apply to private individuals and by 
implication encompasses independent schools. PEPUDA provides that in 
the event of any conflict with any other law, PEPUDA prevails.
68
 Secondly, 
according to the canons of statutory interpretation, the more recent 
legislation prevails which in this case is PEPUDA.
69
 Woolman notes that 
while the Schools Act is a specific sectoral legislation, it does not provide 
that in the event of a conflict, it would prevail.
70
 Accordingly, he argues that 
PEPUDA which gives effect to constitutional provisions prevails and 
independent schools are prohibited from discrimination based on, amongst 
others, religion and culture.
71
 Where discrimination has occurred, the school 
must show that the discrimination is fair, taking into account the factors 
discussed above in the discussion on PEPUDA. Here independent schools 
have additional interests that should be taken into account such as the 
constitutional right of citizens to establish independent schools and whether 
the accommodation detracts from the particular religious and cultural ethos 
the school promotes. 
 
3 HEADSCARVES  AND  HAIRSTYLES 
 
In light of the legal framework set out above, the question is what autonomy 
do schools have to regulate dress and hairstyles? Do independent schools 
have greater independence in enacting their codes of conduct? These 
questions are addressed in reference to perhaps two of the most 
controversial practices: headscarves and hairstyles. 
 
3 1 The  headscarf 
 
Bans on the headscarf are not new and have been the subject of 
controversial debate worldwide.
72
 Lenta notes that while there is some 
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debate as to whether the headscarf is a mandatory requirement in Islam, 
there are sufficient grounds to accept that Muslim women wear the 
headscarf out of a religious obligation and for the practice to be protected by 
the right to freedom of religion.
73
 A school code which prohibits the 
headscarf, or fails to make an exemption for Muslim learners to wear a 
headscarf forces Muslim students to choose between their religious beliefs 
and pursuing their education at the school and constitutes an interference 
with the right to freedom of religion. 
 
3 1 1 Public  schools 
 
Schools are bound by the provisions of PEPUDA and Schools Acts which 
prohibit discrimination on any grounds. The refusal to allow Muslim learners 
to wear a headscarf is an interference with the right to freedom of religion 
and thus constitutes discrimination based on religion which is presumed to 
be unfair unless the school can show otherwise. As discussed earlier, in 
making this determination the court considers the position of the complainant 
in society, whether they were the victim of previous disadvantage, the nature 
of the discrimination, its impact, whether it achieves a legitimate purpose, 
and whether there are less restrictive means of achieving the purpose. The 
court seeks to understand the discrimination’s impact on real people and the 
position an individual occupies in society. 
    Muslims are a minority in South Africa with just over one million Muslims 
out of a population of 54,4 million people.
74
 During apartheid, Christianity 
was favoured by the state at the expense of Islam and other religions
75
 and 
this disadvantage was compounded by the fact that Muslims are 
predominantly Indians and Coloureds, previously disadvantaged groups in 
South Africa.
76
 Furthermore, given the current worldwide climate of 
Islamophobia, Muslims remain a vulnerable minority group in the country. 
    Schools are likely to justify their refusal on the basis that it is necessary 
for discipline, uniformity or to ensure acceptable convention among the 
learners.
77
 However, this appears as a flimsy justification as there is no 
reason to believe that allowing learners to wear a headscarf would 
undermine discipline at schools. Furthermore, the headscarf may be 
incorporated into the uniform, and the colour and way the headscarf is worn 
can be prescribed by the school to ensure uniformity. Furthermore, the 
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National Guidelines on School Uniform, while only a recommendation, 
explicitly mandates governing bodies to consider the religious beliefs of 




    The failure to accommodate a headscarf in a school uniform imposes a 
very heavy burden on Muslim learners who wear it out of a sense of 
obligation. The purpose and the goals of discipline and uniformity at public 
schools could still be achieved by allowing the headscarf but prescribing the 
manner in which it is worn. In light of the Guidelines on School Uniform 
specifically proscribing a headscarf ban, it seems clear that a public school’s 
uniform code that failed to accommodate the headscarf would amount to 




3 1 2 Independent  schools 
 
An additional interest to be considered with independent schools is the 
reason for its establishment. Independent schools are frequently established 
on the basis of religious grounds and schools may refuse to accommodate 
the headscarf on the basis that it conflicts with their religious views. Such 
schools may very well wish to promote a particular religious ideology and 
view the headscarf, and the Islamic beliefs it represents, as a negation of 
these beliefs. Here, the religious freedom of individuals who wish to wear a 
headscarf must be balanced against the constitutional right individuals have 
to establish schools provided they do not discriminate on the basis of race. 
Woolman argues that provided the exclusionary practice is not primarily 
aimed at denying a segment of the population access to goods but the 
pursuit of a legitimate goal, such as a religious association, the practice 
should be considered fair discrimination.
80
 He argues that all associations by 
their nature discriminate and we should not be overzealous in dismantling 




    Woolman’s comments are persuasive and in the context of schools, it is 
easy to understand how religious minorities may wish to establish to 
preserve and promote their religious identity. Religious freedom and the 
desire of parents to educate their children in such a manner should weigh no 
less than the desire of Muslim girls to wear a headscarf. However, a 
complicating factor is the history of inequitable education in South Africa. 
    During apartheid, education was segregated by race and state spending 
on education differed vastly between races. In 1982, the state spent an 
average of R1211.00 on a White child compared to R771.00 on an Indian 
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child, R498.00 on a Coloured child, and R146.00 on a Black child.
82
 The 
result was that White public schools, which also benefited from the affluent 
White communities they served, were significantly better resourced and 
offered a better education than Black schools.
83
 The dawn of democracy has 
done very little to address these inequalities as the top performing public 
schools in the country remain former White public schools.
84
 Admission to 
these schools is largely based on catchment areas and where individuals 
live. This is problematic given that segregation amongst racial groups 
remains “exceptionally high”
85
 and individuals for economic reasons, 
amongst others, continue to live in the former racially designated areas.
86
 
    Individuals who are ineligible for good public schools may thus send their 
children to independent schools not of their religious persuasion which offer 
a better quality of education than the accessible public schools or 
independent schools of their own religious persuasion.
87
 In a context where 
education is hailed as the best equaliser of inequality, should Muslim girls be 
precluded from attending these schools because they are not willing to 
forsake their headscarf? Furthermore, most Muslims are Indian or 
Coloured
88
 and the lack of accommodation would disproportionately affect 
Indian or Coloured females and constitute indirect discrimination on race 
which independent schools are explicitly prohibited from engaging in terms 
of legislation. 
    There is no easy answer as to whether independent schools may 
legitimately refuse to accommodate Muslim girls wearing a headscarf and 
the answer is likely to differ depending on the particular school and the basis 
of its establishment. Independent schools established as religious schools 
may find it easier to justify refusing to accommodate the headscarf than 
schools that merely have a religious ethos. Schools should consider the 
reasons for their refusal and whether the wearing of a headscarf poses a 
real threat to their purposes. Where it does, schools should be empowered 
to enforce their dress codes to ensure the right to establish independent 
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schools has true meaning and value but should do so mindful of the complex 
and very inequitable educational landscape in South Africa. 
 
3 2 Hairstyles 
 
Hairstyles represent a more complex issue. While the rights to religion and 
culture are porous, bans on particular hairstyles will most likely implicate the 
right to culture. In light of the discussion above on defining a cultural 
practice, courts are likely to overlook the question of whether a person 
belongs to a culture and concentrate on whether a hairstyle forms part of a 
culture. On the Ampofo-Anti and Bishop approach, discussed above, courts 
would need to consider whether the practice is followed by a portion of the 
members of the culture who do so because of its cultural significance. While 
a court may easily find that dreadlocks, braids or afros form part of an 
individual’s culture, this may potentially become a very difficult issue for 
courts to evaluate. For example, in one media report a parent of a child who 
was told that his haircut did not comply with the school’s code of conduct 
allegedly claimed that his son’s haircut, which was shaved at the bottom and 
longer at the top and referred to as a “fade” or “step”, was part of his 
culture.
89
 Given the evolving nature of culture and its imprecise limits, courts 
may struggle to ascertain whether such a hairstyle has cultural significance 
or is simply a fashion statement. 
 
3 2 1 Public  schools 
 
As discussed above, schools are prohibited from discrimination on the basis 
of culture by the Constitution, PEPUDA and Schools Act to which they are 
bound. If a hairstyle is found to be a cultural practise, a code of conduct that 
prohibits it or fails to accommodate it constitutes discrimination on the basis 
of culture and the onus is on the school to show the discrimination to be fair. 
    As with the headscarf, the rationale for banning certain hairstyles is most 
likely to promote discipline, uniformity and acceptable convention among the 
learners. A school’s code of conduct is likely to prescribe how hair must be 
worn to achieve these goals. While some may refer generally to the hair 
being neat and tidy, others may detail the length of the hair, how it must be 
worn or tied, the colour of the hairband and so on. The difficulty in South 
Africa is that given our history the notion of neatness is often defined by 
Eurocentric norms with little accommodation for African hairstyles which are 
treated with disdain. 
    During the apartheid era, one of the most egregious tests employed to 
distinguish between individuals for the purposes of classifying them as 
“White” or “Coloured” was the “pencil test”. A pencil was pushed through a 
person’s hair and if it remained in place the person was deemed to have 
frizzy hair and classified as “Coloured”. If the pencil fell the person was 
classified as “White”. Frizzy hair was considered inferior while straight hair 
was positioned as the aspirational superior. Thus, the notion of what 
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constitutes “neat” or “tidy” is often not objective and defined to the prejudice 
of Black learners. Hair remains an emotive and controversial subject and the 
effect of a failing to accommodate hairstyles that have cultural significance 
must be appreciated. 
    Where a hairstyle holds cultural significance for an individual or is part of 
their group identity, failure to accommodate it is likely to have a severe 
emotional impact on the individual. It undermines their identity, autonomy, 
dignity, sense of belonging and self-worth. The dangers of such alienation 
were clearly felt during the 2015−2017 protests in higher education 
institutions. While the protests started because of escalating costs of tertiary 
education, students also voiced frustration at institutions which they 
perceived as alienating and unwelcoming of their beliefs. Tertiary institutions 
were forced to have an honest look at their institutional culture and their 
accommodation of various cultural beliefs. These protests serve as a 
warning of the anger and frustration that festers when rights to culture and 
self-expression are undermined. 
    What does that mean for order and discipline at schools? Given the 
variety of hairstyles that may be claimed under culture, are schools 
effectively precluded from regulating attire and enforcing their codes of 
conduct? Does this open the floodgates to the avalanche of claims under 
cultural accommodation? This question was succinctly answered by the 
Constitutional Court in Pillay when it held− 
 
“[I]f there are other learners who hitherto were afraid to express their religions 
or cultures and who will now be encouraged to do so, that is something to be 
celebrated, not feared. As a general rule, the more learners feel free to 
express their religions and cultures in school, the closer we will come to the 
society envisaged in the Constitution. The display of religion and culture in 
public is not a ‘parade of horribles’ but a pageant of diversity which will enrich 




    If South Africa is to be a true “rainbow” nation, assumed understandings 
of neatness and the priority of uniformity in a diverse society has to be 
questioned. Accommodations are necessary to allow those previously 
marginalised to express themselves and their culture. There is no definitive 
answer on the matter but schools should ask themselves if they have done 
enough to accommodate diverse beliefs and not merely tolerate them. 
 
3 2 2 Independent  schools 
 
While independent schools may be established in the preservation of a 
certain cultural ethos, this does not give them a carte blanche to refuse to 
accommodate hairstyles with a cultural significance. Woolman states that 
the school would have to demonstrate that it was promoting and advancing a 
particular culture and that the discrimination was necessary to offer an 
education grounded in that culture.
91
 This is difficult given that cultures 
overlap and the expression of one may not necessarily detract from the 
other. For example, a school established in the pursuit of German culture 
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would be hard pressed to show that allowing learners to wear afros 
detracted from its objective. 
    Furthermore, failing to accommodate African hairstyles may fall foul of the 
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race. While White learners are 
capable of adopting the hairstyles and also prohibited from doing so, they 
generally do not do so. The media reports point to the fact that Black 
learners were singled out for breaching their school’s code of conduct. The 
hairstyles are predominantly worn by Black learners and a code that does 
not accommodate their hairstyle disproportionately affects Black students 
and constitutes indirect discrimination based on race. While these policies 
appear neutral and benign they can effectively be used to limit access to 
institutions on the basis of race and should in such instances be struck 
down. 
    A final consideration is whether parents who voluntarily agreed to a dress 
code at an independent school can later object to it. In this regard, 
individuals may agree to waive their rights including their cultural and 
religious freedom. However, individuals have a very limited choice if they 
wish to attend a top performing independent school as there are not a 
diverse range of schools to choose from and certainly none of the top 
schools is established for the preservation of Islamic/African culture and 
beliefs. Thus, individuals have no choice but to agree to what may be very 
alienating codes of conduct if they wish to attend these schools. Finally, 
where codes of conduct discriminate based on race, even indirectly, they 
must be struck down. Schools should not be allowed to shield these policies 




The events at schools throughout South Africa in 2016 have led to many 
questions regarding the codes of conduct at both public and independent 
schools. Since the Pillay case, schools cannot merely assert the goals of 
discipline and uniformity to justify refusals to accommodate cultural and 
religious practices. Courts will interrogate thoroughly these refusals and 
expect schools to reasonably accommodate the religious and cultural beliefs 
of their learners. Independent schools are not excluded from this scrutiny 
and while they may pursue specific religious and cultural practices, they 
must clearly illustrate their objectives and that their policies are necessary to 
achieve their objectives. Religious and cultural freedom which are central to 
an individual’s dignity, identity and autonomy cannot be infringed lightly. 
Therefore, this may be an opportune moment for schools to re-look their 
codes of conduct and to honestly evaluate whether their codes reflect the 
spirit of the rainbow nation South Africa aspires to be. 
